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Debate over the potential harmful and criminological impacts of virtual worlds first emerged 
when North American journalist Julian Dibble (1993) documented the Mr Bungle case.  
It involved an alleged ‘virtual rape’ of a female user in the purely text-based virtual world 
called LambdaMOO. Any connection between a virtual and real crime in this case is highly 
debatable, because the harm involved ‘a real-time non-consensual textual description of the 
rape’ through ‘the display…of graphic and offensive…sentences’ (Lastowka & Hunter 2004: 
295). Nevertheless, since the early 1990s, the rapid technological evolution and global 
appeal of many Web 2.0 social software platforms such as Facebook and MySpace 
(Coates, Suzor & Fitzgerald 2007), ensures new forms of user-generated internet content 
and ‘virtual-reality’ pose various risks worthy of ongoing criminological investigation 
(Williams 2006).
Smith, Grabosky and Urbas (2004) define cybercrime as the use of digital technologies to 
commit an offence, behaviour targeting communications technologies, or the use of these 
technologies for the commission of other crimes. Along with improved graphic capabilities, 
their global reach and their immersive or ‘inter-real’ character, the European Network  
and Information Security Agency (ENISA) identify five additional characteristics of three-
dimensional virtual environments (3dves) or virtual worlds:
• persistence, meaning that the virtual environment as it is seen by all users is the same 
and continues to host activity even when users log out (unlike video games, which shut 
down when the user logs off);
• central storage on a database controlled by the service provider;
• users interact in real time;
• a set of physical laws to determine how interactions take place ‘in-world’; and
• participation by using an ‘avatar’ (de Zwart 2009).
These characteristics add to the degree of ‘presence’ associated with 3dve use (Boellstorff 
2008). This feature is the main challenge 3dves pose to conventional understandings of 
cybercrime and cyber-harm.
Foreword  |  Three-dimensional virtual 
environments (3dves) are the new 
generation of digital multi-user social 
networking platforms. Their immersive 
character allows users to create a digital 
humanised representation or avatar, 
enabling a degree of virtual interaction 
not possible through conventional 
text-based internet technologies.  
As recent international experience 
demonstrates, in addition to the 
conventional range of cybercrimes 
(including economic fraud, the 
dissemination of child pornography and 
copyright violations), the ‘virtual-reality’ 
promoted by 3dves is the source of great 
speculation and concern over a range  
of specific and emerging forms of crime 
and harm to users. This paper provides 
some examples of the types of harm 
currently emerging in 3dves and 
suggests internal regulation by user 
groups, terms of service, or end-user 
licensing agreements, possibly linked to 
real-world criminological principles. This 
paper also provides some directions for 
future research aimed at understanding 
the role of Australian criminal law and 
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Games and worlds
Most current generation 3dves are goal-
directed multi-user games. World of 
Warcraft boasts over 11.5 million members 
worldwide (Blizzard 2008) within a platform 
containing various fictitious digital 
landscapes. Users pay an initial fee  
to purchase the gaming software, then 
additional monthly participation fees. Users 
must complete various goal-directed quests, 
such as slaying monsters or gathering 
special items, with the complexity of tasks 
and rewards for successful completion 
increasing the further one journeys through 
each stage. The platform also allows users 
to forge ongoing social ties, while receiving 
training for in-world roles and exchanging 
virtual currency to complete game-based 
objectives.
In contrast, Second Life is not a goal-
directed game, although it supports many 
game-related activities. Abrahams (2007) 
describes Second Life as a virtual world 
promoting various business, educational, 
artistic and governmental activities.
With over 14 million users and 27,000 
parcels of land, the distinctive feature of 
Second Life is a thriving market economy. 
Linden Lab, the platform administrator, 
actively encourages trade through the 
LindeX currency exchange. In April 2009, 
Linden$260 were the equivalent of US$1 
and around Linden$5,851,223,689 were  
in circulation (Linden Lab 2009a).
Users are charged small fees to upload 
content into the platform. However, the bulk 
of trading activity involves land sales, the 
exchange of goods and services such  
as clothing, prefabricated buildings and 
counselling services, and the conversion  
of Lindens$ into real-world currency.
The initial cost of a parcel of land for private 
users is around $1,300, plus a further $900 
each year for maintenance. Educational  
and charitable users are offered discounted 
land rates. In addition, a monthly premium 
membership fee of around $20 provides 
users with Linden$1,000. Land can only be 
purchased by paid members. This structure 
allows fee-payers to develop their own 
virtual environments according to their 
preference, imagination and technical ability.
3dves have been used to develop 
simulations of real-world behaviours useful 
in understanding crime prevention and 
citizenship issues (Hall et al. 2006). 
However, the free-market economic 
structure and real-world value of virtual 
currency blurs the boundaries between  
the virtual and the real.
For example, in 2007, it was estimated that 
up to US$75,000 was lost when the Ginko 
Bank in Second Life collapsed after offering 
investors 40 percent interest per annum on 
their Linden$ investments (Semuels 2008). 
This Ponzi scheme was able to flourish in 
the absence of any real-world regulatory 
scrutiny. It is therefore possible that 3dves 
can provide a lucrative global environment 
for financial scams devoid of any external 
regulatory oversight.
‘Inter-reality’ and immersion
The convergence of technical functions 
promotes two forms of inter-reality in 3dves. 
The first involves the creation of realistic  
3D environments for users to navigate.  
The second relates to the functionality of  
the ‘avatar’, which is the medium through 
which users engage with the 3dve platform 
and other users.
Paid members or site developers create 
fantasy worlds or replicas of real-world 
environments by uploading jpeg images into 
the central data repository and manipulating 
these files to create a 3D landscape. Only 
fully-paid members who own an Island can 
construct an environment in this way.
An ‘avatar’ is a human-like representation  
of its user, which moves through the digital 
world by walking, flying, or ‘teleporting’  
to new locations. The user controls avatar 
movements and can communicate with 
other avatars (users) in real time through 
speech, text or simulated gestures. Studies 
indicate that users place more trust in 
avatars with human characteristics and 
prefer to develop avatars that reflect their 
own gender and racial profiles (Nowak & 
Rauh 2005). However, with a few simple 
commands, users can easily alter their 
avatar’s physical appearance, switch  
gender or adopt any number of fictitious  
or androgynous characteristics.
These immersive and synchronous elements 
of 3dves alter conventional notions of 
cyber-harm by converging text, audio and 
video communication methods. Therefore, 
offensive conduct can encompass 
interaction through speech, gestures,  
or simulated behaviours including sexual 
acts, assaults, gunshots and even terrorist 
attacks.
The reach of real-world law
The question of whether real-world notions 
of interpersonal harm apply to virtual assault 
or sexual assault is unresolved. This 
complicates the question of regulation within 
virtual worlds. Rather than developing a  
new realm of ‘fantasy law’ neatly delineated, 
administered and enforced solely within 3dve 
domains (Brenner 2008), it appears that 
various formal, informal and preventative 
social control measures will invariably 
co-exist to cater for the specific technical 
capacities of 3dves and the needs of 
individual users and user groups (Wall & 
Williams 2007).
A virtual rape?
In May 2007, a female user of Second Life 
informed Belgian police that her avatar had 
been raped. Reports suggested:
...the Brussels Court will be working 
together with the Federal Computer 
Crime Unit to ‘patrol in Second Life’...
There are no details at this time about 
what actually occurred…or under what 
laws these virtual actions would be 
prosecuted, however…‘the public 
prosecutor was alarmed,’ which may 
hint at how seriously this case is being 
taken (Weber 2007).
A person controlling an avatar that is 
unexpectedly raped or assaulted might 
experience the physical reaction of ‘freezing’, 
or the associated shock, distrust and loss of 
confidence in using 3dves. While civil redress 
for psychological harm is conceivable, the 
‘disembodied’ character of such an incident 
would invariably bar liability for any crime 
against the person (MacKinnon 1997).
However, Australian federal criminal law 
imposes a maximum penalty of three years 
imprisonment for using an internet carriage 
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service to ‘menace, harass or cause 
offence’ to another user (Criminal Code 
1995 s. 474.17). Further, US and Australian 
laws ban simulated or actual depictions  
of child abuse and pornography (Rogers 
2009). Therefore, any representations  
of child avatars involved in virtual sexual 
activity, torture or physical abuse are 
prohibited, regardless of whether the 
real-world user is an adult or child (Criminal 
Code 1995 Part 10.6 Division 474). Liability 
is imposed where a reasonable person 
would consider the alleged behaviour to  
be offensive, which could extend to any 
‘socially questionable content’ (Gray & 
Nikolakos 2007: 105) such as depictions of 
drug use, sexual violence, strong language 
or blood and gore.
Decentralised governance
In response to the Ginko Bank incident, 
Linden Lab declared it unlawful for any 
individual or collective to offer interest or 
direct returns on investments ‘without proof 
of an applicable government registration 
statement or financial institution charter’ 
(Linden Lab 2008). In-world gambling and 
the use of avatars depicting child characters 
are also expressly banned in Second Life. 
However, it is rare for 3dve platform 
administrators to be proactive in matters of 
in-world regulation and governance. Indeed, 
the most effective in-world governance 
methods appear to involve ‘proximal’ 
techniques, such as in-group reputation or 
shame-management strategies, rather than 
‘distal’ or external policing and criminal 
justice interventions (Wall & Williams 2007). 
The burdens of maintaining good order and 
resolving disputes in the numerous sites 
within any global multi-user 3dve platform 
makes stringent enforcement or dispute 
resolution processes impractical and unlikely.
A decentralised model of governance, 
where formal law plays a limited role in 
maintaining order, is common to most 
3dves, especially where there are rules  
to facilitate game-related objectives. 
Nevertheless, all 3dve are subject to a range 
of informal behavioural norms and semi-
formal rules with the capacity to influence 
the behaviour of regular users or occasional 
visitors. Activity within 3dves must also 
conform to conventional legal requirements 
in the host jurisdiction, although this is 
complicated by the lack of international 
harmonisation of cybercrime laws (Smith, 
Grabosky & Urbas 2004).
Terms of service
All 3dve users must agree to the platform’s 
Terms of Service (ToS) or an End User 
Licence Agreement (EULA) when registering 
an account. If the user chooses not to 
agree, regardless of whether or not they 
have read the specific terms clause-by-
clause, the program will not install into the 
host computer. 
The unilateral nature of these standardised 
contracts gives rise to some concern over 
their enforceability and the potential for the 
terms to be unconscionable where they 
restrict the right to appeal decisions of  
3dve site administrators (Duranske 2008). 
However, these agreements are one way of 
ensuring users are aware that their in-world 
conduct can be scrutinised and subject to 
formal disciplinary action.
The ToS for Second Life include advice 
on how to establish an account, intellectual 
property rights for content developed within 
the platform and disclaimers absolving 
Linden Lab from responsibility for content 
developed within the platform. The ToS also 
contain a list of standards applicable to all 
Second Life users.
Linden Lab retains the right to suspend  
or terminate an account in the event of a 
reported breach. The community standards 
prohibit:
• transmitting content violating the 
contractual or fiduciary rights of a third 
party, or any law or regulation;
• impersonating or misrepresenting your 
affiliation with a person or entity without 
their consent;
• attempting to access another’s account;
• transmitting content that Linden Lab 
considers ‘harmful, threatening, abusive, 
harassing, causes tort, defamatory, vulgar, 
obscene, libellous, invasive of another’s 
privacy, hateful, or racially, ethnically or 
otherwise objectionable’;
• interfering with the service, servers or 
networks connected to the platform;
• transmitting unsolicited or unauthorised 
junk mail, spam, chain letters or pyramid 
schemes; and
• stalking, abusing or attempting to abuse or 
harass other users (Linden Lab 2009b: np).
A weekly Incident Report documents any 
action taken to enforce the terms of service, 
usually after a complaint from an aggrieved 
user (Linden Lab 2009c). Each report lists 
the date, nature and location of the breach, 
as well as the penalty imposed, which usually 
consists of an official warning or account 
suspension for one, three or seven days. 
Breaches and penalties listed during a  
two day period in May 2009 included:
• warnings—unauthorised gambling, 
harassment (land cutting), sexual 
harassment, assault in a safe area, verbal 
abuse, indecency (displaying mature 
content in a restricted area), disturbing  
the peace through unsolicited chain 
letters, pyramid schemes and using 
harmful scripted objects;
• one day suspensions—disturbing the 
peace, abuse of sandbox resources,  
acts of indecency (unspecified);
• three day suspensions—disturbing the 
peace (unsolicited scripting), wagering;
• seven day suspensions—chain letters or 
pyramid schemes, harassment, violence, 
offensive behaviour in kids-only area.
This fairly vague ‘naming and shaming’ 
measure demonstrates that most actionable 
in-world behaviours receive fairly innocuous 
penalties. This justifies further research  
on the frequency and impact of these 
behaviours and complainant satisfaction 
with current disciplinary procedures.
Site specific governance
User-communities can invoke their own 
environment or task-specific regulatory 
procedures. These could incorporate any 
combination of market forces, digital coding, 
informal behavioural norms or even the 
establishment of site-specific policing, 
security and vigilante services (Wall & 
Williams 2007).
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Net federalism
Johnson and Post (1996) used net-
federalism to describe the decentralised 
regulatory nature of the internet. Figure 1 
indicates this model can be easily adapted 
to explain regulatory approaches in 3dves.
Under the net-federalism model, layers of 
site-specific governance are developed by 
user communities within the 3dve platform. 
These are overlaid by the platform’s ToS  
and EULAs which, in turn, co-exist with  
four generic forms of regulatory control to 
promote good conduct and site security: 
formal law, market forces, informal norms 
and digital code (Lessig 1999).
Figure 1 Net federalism and bubbles of 
governance in 3dves
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Recent law enforcement literature  
indicates decentralised policing and  
security arrangements exist in all realms of 
contemporary social life. This tends to occur 
when conventional forms of centralised 
policing no longer meet the crime prevention 
needs of diverse communities (Shearing & 
Wood 2003), or where ‘opportunistic’ forms 
of third-party policing evolve to support 
specific interests of the state or concerned 
social groups (Mazerolle & Ransley 2006).
The sheer technical sophistication and 
variety of digital coding mechanisms and 
site-specific conduct norms to identify and 
prevent harmful activity also ensure 
considerable levels of ‘responsibilisation’ are 
actively promoted by the very structure of 
3dve platforms (O’Malley & Palmer 1996). 
This means individual users or user-groups 
do not require extensive scrutiny or 
intervention by formal justice agencies  
or site administrators in response to the 
majority of 3dve harms. Provided they have 
the technical knowledge, user groups are 
arguably best situated to develop viable 
forms of digital coding or site-specific norms 
to prevent harm to digital infrastructure or 
other users (Wall & Williams 2007).
A typology of 3dve harm
In a decentralised and highly technical 
environment with high levels of user 
‘responsibilisation’ for harm identification, 
prevention and the development of 
appropriate norms of good conduct, there  
is considerable uncertainty surrounding role 
of the criminal law in these multi-user 
platforms. This uncertainty is compounded 
by the wide range of regulatory choices 
available to users, confusion over the 
real-world implications of much of the 
behaviour within 3dves, the transnational 
appeal and jurisdictional uncertainties 
associated with these emerging media  
and the broader lack of empirical research 
documenting how 3dve users perceive 
issues relating to harm, risk, safety and 
governance.
The body of knowledge on each of these 
issues is so recent that it is premature to 
speculate on the ideal role of the criminal 
law in this field. Nevertheless, a basic 
typology of harms associated with 3dve  
use can help to clarify the various regulatory 
and harm-prevention strategies available to 
individuals, user communities and formal 
justice agencies.
Table 1 outlines a graded series of harms 
associated with 3dve use, ranging from 
behaviours with purely in-world implications 
considered too trivial to warrant formal 
action, to those with clearly actionable 
consequences under the criminal law. 
Within these extremes, a grey area of 
inter-real harms bridges the virtual and the 
real. Inter-real harms differ from conventional 
cybercrimes due to the peculiarly immersive 
character of 3dve technologies. How 3dve 
users view the severity of these harms is  
the most appropriate measure of the ideal 
regulatory approach in any given case.
Harms mediated by the technical or coding 
mechanisms facilitated by the platform 
should remain subject to current disciplinary 
and complaints processes established  
by platform administrators or under ToS 
agreements. For example, while activities 
such as digital cloning might generate fears 
that 3dves facilitate widespread and 
persistent identity thefts, systematic frauds, 
obscene behaviour or predatory real-world 
conduct (Wall 2008; Yar 2008), these 
nuisances are best prevented through 
rigorous internal digital coding modifications 
or informal policing, enforcement and 
dispute resolution methods (Wall & Williams 
2007).
Table 1 A basic typology of 3dve harms
Types of harm Conduct Proposed outcome
Purely in-world harm Cloning, theft, appropriation or damage to 
digital property of limited value or which can 
be easily replaced, breach of gaming rules 
(cheating), innocuous harassment, obscenity 
(flying genitalia, bots)
Internal regulation by user groups (including 
eviction), ToS, EULAs or formal discipline, 
methods of coding to prevent harm developed 
by platform managers
Inter-real harm Conduct affecting avatars or property with real 
world physical or economic consequences: 
includes virtual rape, assault, sexual 
harassment, fraud and deception, destruction 
of property, abusive or threatening speech
Real-world impact must be measurable and 
substantial to justify formal intervention beyond 
the ToS, EULA and site management complaint 
processes
Criminal harm Conspiracies or threats to engage in crime 
against the person, property, the state, 
communication networks or children: includes 
stalking, privacy, piracy and copyright 
violations, money laundering, disabling or 
tampering with 3dve platforms
Conventional criminal laws subject to 
jurisdictional issues and the severity or 
prevalence of the conduct. Internet Service 
Providers or platform managers to provide 
evidence of real-world offending
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The rape of an avatar may produce some 
real-world physical discomfort or shock 
among unsuspecting or novice users 
(Boellstorff 2008: 189). This could be 
prevented through modifying simulation 
codes, in- or real-world counselling to  
deal with psychological or emotional harms 
or improved education about recognised 
risks for new 3dve users. Formal criminal 
intervention would only have a place if  
an appreciable and measurable effect on 
the real-world victim could be established, 
or if the violation clearly falls under the 
established criminal provisions targeting 
harmful online conduct (Criminal Code 1995 
Part 10.6).
Similarly, most cases of financial deception 
or the purchase of faulty virtual goods in 
3dves will involve a minor in-world financial 
penalty in the order of Linden$10. Market 
force and greater education for vulnerable 
users will play a more useful harm-prevention 
role than the enforcement of ToS agreements 
or any formal legal provisions.
In contrast, systematic and organised 
scams aimed at using 3dves as a means  
of making illicit profits or for laundering 
real- and virtual-world money clearly have 
coverage under existing criminal laws. Here, 
the major complexity lies in assessing the 
scale of harm to justify a formal criminal 
investigation. In such cases, Internet Service 
Providers and platform administrators would 
provide crucial support to investigators 
aiming to establish a successful prosecution 
satisfying the criminal burden of proof.
Research directions
The various strands associated with  
harm, safety, immersion and regulation  
in 3dves greatly extend our conventional 
understanding of cybercrime. Three pertinent 
issues should underscore future research in 
this field.
The first involves enhancing our 
understanding of the nature of harm within 
multi-user 3dve platforms. Our preliminary 
typology and the work of ENISA (2008) 
provide useful starting points. ENISA’s 
detailed report recommended the 
development of industry-wide standards  
to prevent intellectual property violations, 
spamming, poor user authentication 
procedures, automated attacks and in-world 
harassment, along with greater legal clarity 
of each of these issues.
Future research should also assess 
perceptions of harm, risk and appropriate 
educational and prevention strategies 
amongst 3dve users. This is crucial, given 
most calls for increased regulation of new 
technologies are made by those with little 
direct experience or understanding of how 
they are used or how they might cause 
harm (Wall 2008; Yar 2008).
Second, the Internet Safety Technical Task 
Force (2008) at Harvard University 
advocates ongoing collaborative research  
to protect children through enhanced 
privacy and security mechanisms. As with 
any internet platform, children and parents 
require systematic education on how to 
avoid clearly predatory behaviours by those 
who intentionally prey on or misrepresent 
their identities to lure or groom children into 
illegal and harmful real-world activities.
The Task Force also suggested:
Members of the Internet community 
should continue to work with child safety 
experts, technologists, public policy 
advocates, social services and law 
enforcement to:
• develop and incorporate a range of 
technologies as part of their strategy  
to protect minors from harm online;
• set standards for using technologies 
and sharing data;
• identify and promote best practices  
on implementing technologies as they 
emerge and as online safety issues 
evolve; and
• put structures in place to measure 
effectiveness (Internet Safety Technical 
Taskforce 2008: 6).
These principles apply to other forms of 
harm that might have substantive financial 
or physical effects on adult users, regardless 
of their level of 3dve expertise.
Finally, the inherently qualitative nature  
of current research in 3dve and Web 2.0 
environments raises several challenging 
ethical questions. While research ‘stings’ 
supported by police agencies provide 
valuable insights into how unlawful 
encounters with children are solicited 
(Jayawardena & Broadhurst 2007), 
problems of informed consent and potential 
entrapment abound, and are magnified by 
the anonymity and pseudonymity of 3dve 
users. More critical discussion of these 
ethical imperatives (Williams 2007) is clearly 
warranted.
Clearly, Australian 3dve users require more 
knowledge to identify, manage and prevent 
harm. Developing a systematic approach  
to harmonise current knowledge on these 
emerging issues is perhaps the greatest 
research priority.
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